Will the government attempt to stop VoIP encryption?

If we fail to encrypt VoIP organized crime will be able to wiretap prosecutors and judges, revealing details of ongoing investigations, and conversations with their wives about what time to pick up their kids at school.
It’s a fair question to ask in a post-9/11 world. Just how likely would it be for the government to restrict the end user’s use of secure VoIP? The question of whether strong cryptography should be restricted by the government was debated all through the 1990s. This debate had the participation of the White House, the NSA, the FBI, the courts, the Congress, the computer industry, civilian academia, and the press. This debate fully took into account the question of terrorists using strong crypto, and in fact that was one of the core issues of the debate. Nonetheless, society’s collective decision (over the FBI’s objections) was that on the whole, we would be better off with strong crypto, unencumbered with government back doors. The export controls were lifted and no domestic controls were imposed. This was a good decision, because we took the time and had such broad expert participation. The 9/11 attacks did not change the wisdom of that collective decision, and although civil liberties on the whole have eroded since then, we haven’t lost our right to use strong crypto.
The law enforcement community will be understandably concerned about the effects encrypted VoIP will have on their ability to perform lawful intercepts. But what will be the overall effects on the criminal justice system if we fail to encrypt VoIP? Historically, law enforcement has benefited from a strong asymmetry in the feasibility of government or criminals wiretapping the PSTN. As we migrate to VoIP, that asymmetry collapses. VoIP interception is so easy, organized crime will be able to wiretap prosecutors and judges, revealing details of ongoing investigations, names of witnesses and informants, and conversations with their wives about what time to pick up their kids at school. The law enforcement community will come to recognize that VoIP encryption actually serves their vital interests.
In the early 1990s, the government tried to control the end user’s use of crypto by introducing the Clipper chip. That didn’t go over too well politically, and had to be abandoned. The government will find it difficult to try again to stop end users from encrypting their traffic, regardless of whether that traffic is email, e-commerce web transactions, or VoIP calls.
Further, the government would have to force everyone to abandon peer-to-peer communication protocols in favor of centralized, old Eastern-Bloc-style, panoptic ways of doing things. That’s not the direction technology has been heading. Rather than a “war on terrorism”, the government would have to conduct a war on technology.

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  • 12-Jun-2017
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